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Abstract
A strength of liberal political institutions is their ability to accommo-
date pluralism, both allowing divergent comprehensive doctrines as well
as constructing the common ground necessary for diverse people to live
together. A pressing question is how far such pluralism extends. Which
comprehensive doctrines are simply beyond the pale and need not be
accommodated by a political consensus? Rawls attempted to keep the
boundaries of reasonable disagreement quite broad by infamously deny-
ing that political liberalism need make reference to the concept of truth,
a claim that has been criticized by Joseph Raz, Joshua Cohen, and David
Estlund. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms fail due to the
fact that political liberalism can remain non-committal on the nature of
truth, leaving the concept of truth in the domain of comprehensive doc-
trines while still avoiding the issues raised by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund.
Further substantiating this point is the fact that Rawls would, and should,
include parties in the overlapping consensus whose views on truth may be
incoherent. Once it is seen that political liberalism allows such incoher-
ence to reasonable parties, it is clear that the inclusion of truth and the
requirement of coherence urged by Raz, Cohen, and Estlund requires more
of reasonable people than is necessary for a political consensus.1
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Introduction
Political liberalism aims to discover institutions that can be justified to deeply
diverse citizens, citizens who disagree on basic matters of faith, morality, and
metaphysics. A pressing question, however, is how much disagreement can be
accommodated. Not just any views can be accounted for by political liberalism
– doctrines which are patently unreasonable or refuse to tolerate disagreement,
for example, need not be included in the political consensus. Although certain
practical incompatibilities may render cooperation impossible, political liberal-
ism strives to accommodate a very wide range of theoretical views, a diversity
limited only by what Rawls calls “reasonableness.” We argue that reasonable-
ness is a practical criterion, one which places few requirements on the theoretical
aspects of comprehensive doctrines. As we will see, one of the ways in which it
accomplishes this is by avoiding deep and controversial questions regarding the
nature of moral obligation, of truth, and of the conceptual connections between
such notions.
Many critics, most notably Joseph Raz, Joshua Cohen, and David Estlund,
believe this approach to be deeply mistaken.2 They argue that political liber-
alism requires a commitment to truth, claiming that incoherence results from
leaving out the concept of truth altogether. The commitment of political liber-
alism to truth, however, is rejected by John Rawls. Rawls asserts that political
justification functions without recourse to the concept of truth: “[Political con-
structivism] does not...use (or deny) the concept of truth; nor does it question
that concept, nor could it say that the concept of truth and its idea of the rea-
sonable are the same. Rather, within itself the political conception does without
the concept of truth.”3 The foundations of political liberalism, Rawls maintains,
may proceed without recourse to the concept of truth. Indeed, as we will argue,
the aims of political liberalism require the avoidance of truth claims.
In Section 1, we present the critiques of Raz, Cohen, and Estlund along with
their proposal of Conception Indifference, arguing in Section 2 that Concep-
tion Indifference is incompatible with two of Rawls’s commitments: his notion
of reasonableness and the publicity condition. Section 3 then explains how,
by remaining radically incomplete, political liberalism avoids the heavy costs
that Rawls’s critics ascribe to truth-abstinence. Thus, while Section 2 lays the
groundwork for demonstrating the high cost of maintaining Conception Indiffer-
ence, Section 3 compares the cost of doing so to the cost of avoiding the concept
of truth altogether. The main upshot of our analysis is that Conception Indiffer-
ence is more costly and truth-avoidance less costly than Rawls’s critics suppose.
In Section 4, we refocus the discussion and respond to each of Rawls’s critics
in turn, ultimately concluding that truth abstinence within political liberalism
2See Cohen (2009), Estlund (1998), and Raz (1990). For earlier criticisms, see Gardiner
(1985) and Hampton (1989), especially p. 807. Habermas (1995) is also critical of Rawls’s
failure to appeal to the concept of truth.
3See Rawls (2005), p. 94.
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withstands the criticisms of Raz, Cohen, Estlund, and others who criticize it on
the basis of some alleged connection between truth and political justification.
1 Rawls’s Critics
There have been several criticisms leveled against Rawls’s exclusion of the con-
cept of truth from political constructivism. One important critique comes from
Joseph Raz, who argues that the acceptability of Rawls’s theory of justice is in-
consistent with a refusal to assert its truth. In Raz’s view, regarding a principle
of justice as acceptable entails regarding the principle as true:
To recommend [a theory of justice] as a theory of justice for our societies
is to recommend it as a just theory of justice, that is, as a true, or
reasonable, or valid theory of justice. If it is argued that what makes it
the theory of justice for us is that it is built on an overlapping consensus
and therefore secures stability and unity, then consensus-based stability
and unity are the values that a theory of justice, for our society, is assumed
to depend on. Their achievement – that is, the fact that endorsing the
theory leads to their achievement – makes the theory true, sound, valid,
and so forth. This at least is what such a theory is committed to. There
can be no justice without truth.4
According to Raz, if a political conception is acceptable as the focus of an over-
lapping consensus and if this acceptability vindicates its principles, then the
political conception must be “true, sound, valid, and so forth” in virtue of its
ability to serve as the focus of an overlapping consensus. In other words, recom-
mending a theory of justice (according to any given standard) commits one to
asserting that the theory is true. If Raz is correct and if Rawls does, in fact, as-
sert that his theory of justice satisfies the proper normative-political standards
of acceptability, then Rawls also claims – perhaps unwittingly – that his theory
of justice is true, thereby failing to avoid the concept of truth as he had hoped to.
In a similar vein, Joshua Cohen sees a contradiction in being non-committal
with respect to the concept of truth while still employing other concepts closely
related to truth. Many of the activities associated with political deliberation
appear to be conceptually connected with truth – activities such as “thinking,
asserting, believing, judging, and reasoning”5 – and thus it is problematic to
employ these concepts in political deliberation while simultaneously eschewing
all reference to truth. One of the activities that Cohen explores in detail is that
of believing. Many hold that beliefs aim at being true, and that insofar as a
person accepts the falsity of a proposition, they cease to believe it.6 If this is
correct – and, we must admit, it seems quite plausible – then by believing that
4See Raz (1990), p. 15. Emphasis in the original.
5See Cohen, p. 15.
6See Williams (2002), p. 67. For further work on truth as the aim of belief, see Brandom
(2001), Chan (2013), Railton (1994), Shah (2003), Velleman (2000 and 2005), Wedgwood
(2002), and Whiting (2010 and 2013).
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p, a person undertakes a mental commitment to the truth of p. It is therefore
unclear how parties to the overlapping consensus can believe the accepted con-
ception of justice without simultaneously affirming its truth. For such reasons,
Cohen maintains, Rawls’s vision of political deliberation cannot proceed with-
out some concept of truth.
What does political liberalism need in order to not be driven to incoherence?
Cohen opts for a political conception of truth, a conception that is meant to
remain neutral between various theories of truth by saying nothing that corre-
spondence theorists, pragmatists, or deflationists would deny. Instead, it sticks
to a basic set of platitudes concerning the concept of truth to which all parties
to the debate can agree: (1) Believing, asserting, and judging is to believe, as-
sert, or judge to be true, (2) True beliefs present things as they are, (3) There is
a distinction between justified belief and true belief such that a political belief
can be justified and yet not true, and (4) Truth is important in a way that
is distinct from justification.7 By adopting (1)-(4), Cohen thinks that pub-
lic reason will then be able to proceed on steady ground, able to make sense of
belief, assertion, and reasoning with recourse to the political conception of truth.
Whereas both Raz and Cohen emphasize the apparent incoherence of engag-
ing in public deliberation while rejecting the concept of truth, David Estlund
focuses on normative issues, arguing that the inconsistency in Rawls’s thought
lies in the avoidance of truth along with the claim that Rawls’s principles of
justice can create actual moral obligations or justify coercion. On Rawls’s view,
reasonableness can play the role of truth in political deliberation by adjudicat-
ing between competing conceptions of justice. The political conception that
constitutes the focus of an overlapping consensus attains vindication via its rea-
sonable acceptability, not its truth.8 Against this suggestion, Estlund argues
that such acceptance fails to adequately ground moral obligations and political
coercion:
Suppose, in order to avoid the truth, we understand political liberalism
not as ordering an account of the true standard but simply as using a
standard that is acceptable to all reasonable people (the standard it-
self being acceptability to reasonable people)...The question is whether it
could ground obligation and justify coercion even if the acceptance crite-
rion it uses were not true. Never mind for the moment whether political
liberalism says anything on this question; the answer to the question is
that it could not have those moral consequences irrespective of the truth
on those matters.9
Thus, according to Estlund, if Rawls maintains his ambivalent attitude towards
7See Cohen (2009), p. 27.
8For the sake of brevity and focus, we gloss over tricky ambiguities in Rawls’s justificatory
approach. For alternative ways of interpreting Rawls’s project, see Barry (1995), Dreben
(2003), and Gaus and van Schoelandt (2017).
9See Estlund (1998), pp. 261-262.
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truth, his theory of justice cannot generate moral obligations for the reasonable
participants in the overlapping consensus.
To drive his point home, Estlund asks us to consider the following thought.
Rawls wants us to believe that what matters in political deliberation is ac-
ceptability to reasonable people. But why should acceptance by such a group
matter? Perhaps the principle of reasonable acceptability must pass its own
test, that is, the principle of reasonable acceptability must be acceptable to all
reasonable people. But this necessary condition does not suffice to establish
the normative import of reasonable acceptability. After all, there are plenty of
self-affirming groups we could choose from – acceptability to all redheads, or to
all members of the Branch Davidian cult, for instance – but what is lacking is
a criterion for favoring one of these groups over the others. One response, that
reasonable people tend to settle on true principles of justice, is not available to
Rawls due to his forbearance of truth. Estlund thinks that without claiming
that reasonable acceptability is the “true” standard of admissibility in public
discourse, Rawls’s “view loses any way to select among the plurality of insular
groups, and it becomes untenable.”10 Without specifying why acceptability to
reasonable persons is a better standard than acceptability to Branch Davidians,
Rawls’s account fails to justify his particular principles of justice. Insofar as
Rawls fails to justify his principles of justice, Rawls also fails to explain why the
overlapping consensus gives rise to moral obligations. An agreement amongst
all Branch Davidians would not give rise to such obligations, so why think that
a consensus of reasonable people would? In order to remedy this deficiency,
Estlund offers a proposal about how to introduce truth back into public reason.
On Estlund’s view, parties to the overlapping consensus need merely accept a
minimal “truth schema” — p is true if and only if p — and that such a schema
is sufficiently minimal to function as a public conception of truth. The point
may seem minor, but Estlund hopes that, by accepting a conception of truth
back into political liberalism, public deliberation will be able to provide an ap-
propriate ground for moral obligations.
Even some of Rawls’s defenders find Estlund’s minimal conception of truth
acceptable within a Rawlsian framework. Jonathan Quong, for example, though
critical of Estlund’s overall argument, recognizes that Rawls does (and must)
make various claims in justifying his favored political conception. Quong notes
that there must be “a sense in which Rawls thinks all these claims are true, a
sense in which Rawls contends someone would be making an error if they were
to affirm the opposite of any of these claims. Let us say that these claims must
be true in a mundane sense. Here we can follow David Estlund and say that
P is true in the mundane sense if and only if P.”11 Although our interpretation
of Rawls has certain affinities with Quong’s, we believe that Rawls endorses an
even more radical form of truth-abstinence than Quong suggests. As we argue
10Ibid, p. 260.
11See Quong (2011), p.224.
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in Section 3, even the minimal or “mundane” conception of truth poses prob-
lems for Rawls’s project, while its avoidance does not raise the issues that worry
Rawls’s critics.
All three criticisms of Rawls object to the same, stringent doctrine concern-
ing the role of truth in political justification:
No Political Concept – Political Constructivism does not appeal to
the concept of truth, remaining noncommittal about the role of truth in
political justification and about which, if any, concepts it employs are
conceptually linked to truth
Neither Raz, Cohen, nor Estlund think that Rawls can get by with No Polit-
ical Concept. Raz thinks that the act of recommending a principle of justice
is conceptually linked to truth. Cohen argues that there are several concepts
at play in deliberation – belief, assertion, and reasoning – that are conceptu-
ally connected to truth. Estlund holds that justifying obligations and coercion
requires a foundational doctrine that is in fact true. All of these critiques are
unique – claiming that the principles of justice must be true is quite distinct
from requiring that a standard of reasonable acceptability is true. What unites
Rawls’s critics, however, is the thought that justifying political liberalism ulti-
mately depends on the concept of truth.12
An attractive alternative to truth-abstinence, suggested by Rawls’s critics,
can be formulated as follows:
Conception Indifference – Political liberalism appeals to the truth of
some claims and employs concepts that are conceptually connected to
truth, but it need not adjudicate between competing theories of truth13
The benefit of Conception Indifference is that it can address all of the previous
worries without being too exclusive. Rawls could simply agree with his critics
that truth does have an important role to play in establishing the structure and
role of political discourse without identifying a uniquely correct theory of truth.
This thin concept of truth could then be used to respond to the critiques of
Raz, Cohen, and Estlund, or so the story goes.
2 The Incompatibility of Conception Indifference
The criticisms of Raz, Cohen, and Estlund seem to provide good reasons to
question the eschewal of truth that Rawls advocates. However, to reject Rawls’s
approach before considering the reasons for Rawls’s abstention from this concept
12Thank you to an anonymous reviewer from this journal for asking us to clarify the rela-
tionship between the three critiques of Rawls. Even though Raz, Cohen, and Estlund argue
that Rawls needs truth at different points, the objections are united in thinking Rawls cannot
do without an appeal to truth.
13Versions of Conception Indifference are explicitly endorsed by Cohen (2009) and Estlund
(1998).
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would, of course, be premature. In fact, examining the reasons that Rawls states
for avoiding truth reveals an incompatibility between Conception Indifference,
the notion of reasonableness, and Rawls’s publicity condition. This section be-
gins by examining Rawls’s notion of reasonableness, with a particular emphasis
on why a reasonable person may not be able to endorse a conception of truth.
We then turn to Rawls’s motivation for avoiding the concept of truth, arguing
that involving the concept of truth in the procedure of political constructivism
would undermine key goals of Rawls’s project.
2.1 The Reasonable
Unravelling the meaning of “reasonable” is no simple task.14 The two most
important uses of the “reasonableness” concern (1) reasonable doctrines15 and
(2) reasonable persons. For the topic of political constructivism, it is the second
of these two notions that plays a dominant role. In Lecture III of Political
Liberalism, Rawls identifies two key features of reasonable persons:
The idea of the reasonable is given in part, again for our purposes, by
the two aspects of persons’ being reasonable: their willingness to propose
and abide by fair terms of social cooperation among equals and their
recognition of and willingness to accept the consequences of the burdens
of judgment.16
In other words, a reasonable person is a conditional, rule-following cooperator,
and tolerates diverse viewpoints in light of the difficulty of coming to conclusions
on matters of faith, morality, and other fundamentals.17 For a reasonable person
then, the most attractive political conception of justice will be one that all
could recognize as adequate, one that is acceptable, even if not ideal, from the
perspectives of diverse citizens.18 Such a conception, Rawls submits, is one
that is built up from values that all endorse, values that are not particular to
any comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, citizens, insofar as they are reasonable,
recognize that a political conception of justice based on commonly held values
and conceptions is one that is worthy of endorsement. Such a conception could
thus operate as the focus of an overlapping consensus among all reasonable
14For more on the interpretive difficulty surrounding reasonableness, see Wenar (1995).
15For the three features of a reasonable doctrine, see Rawls (2005), p. 59.
16Ibid, p. 94
17Emphasis on the conditional and rule-following aspects of reasonableness can be found in
Rawls (2005), p. 49.
18In a paper not addressed here, Estlund raises potential issues with the compromise ap-
proach, arguing that it results in mere “ersatz” justice, rather than true, bona fide justice
(Estlund 2012, pp. 262-7). Though interesting and important, this argument falls outside the
purview of this paper. Worth noting is that Rawls explicitly rejects a compromise approach,
arguing instead that the political conception can find support within the various compre-
hensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens, (Rawls 1996, pp. 170-1). Reconciling the
rejection of the compromise approach with Rawls’s later acknowledgement that reasonable
citizens endorse a diverse plurality of liberal conceptions of justice raises serious interpretive
difficulties. For an exploration of this topic, see Gaus (2014), (2018).
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persons.19 Reasonable citizens must therefore satisfy Reasonableness:
Reasonableness – Citizens are reasonable if they are willing to accept
and abide by fair terms of cooperation and to tolerate other viewpoints
due to their recognition of the burdens of judgment
An important feature of the reasonable, or rather, an important omission, is that
reasonable persons need not hold correct beliefs. The conception of a reasonable
person is purely practical, not epistemic or, in Kantian terms, theoretical.20 So
long as persons meet certain basic requirements that allow us to live peacefully
alongside them – namely, Rawls’s two features of reasonableness – we can come
to political agreement.
The critical importance of this characterization of reasonableness becomes
evident upon considering concrete cases. Consider, for example, that Reason-
ableness does not exclude a citizen who holds Classical Political Noncognitivism
from the overlapping consensus:
Classical Political Noncognitivism – Political assertions are neither
true nor false21
What is the motivation for such a view? Propositions pertaining to politi-
cal life are often normative in nature, discussing norms of justice and obliga-
tion. Philosophers who endorse moral noncognitivism about normative domains
would thus be drawn to a variety of political noncognitivism. Moral noncog-
nitivism, of course, has a distinguished history. Beginning with emotivists like
A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, there have been a wealth of examples of noncogni-
tivists, including Hare’s prescriptivism, Blakburn’s quasi-realism, and Gibbard’s
expressivism.22 There are thus a number of moral noncognitivists who would
likely give a noncognitivist account of discourse about justice and political obli-
gation, securing the motivation for political noncognitivism.
19To simplify the discussion, we focus on the notion of reasonableness as applied to persons
rather than to doctrines. As applied to doctrines, the meaning of reasonableness is obscure.
Wenar (1995) argues that ts original definition is far too permissive to achieve what Rawls
wants. When drastically modified by Rawls (1997) in his later work, it becomes too stringent,
since a reasonable doctrine must countenance “the essentials of a constitutional democratic
polity”. This second characterization is as problematic as the first, since it threatens to render
Rawls’s project trivial (see our Section 3).
20See Rawls (2005), p. 93.
21We label this doctrine classical in order to distinguish it from the many forms of noncog-
nitivism that accept some minimalist version of truth; see our next paragraph. Throughout
this paper, we use the term ‘political noncognitivism’ and its cognates to stand for Classical
Political Noncognitivist unless otherwise indicated.
22For examples of classical moral noncognitivism, see Ayer (1936), ch. 6, and Stevenson
(1937). For updated versions of non-cognitivism that maintain that moral judgments are
neither true nor false, see Blackburn (1984), Gibbard (1990), and Hare (1952). Blackburn’s
later views, however, adopt a minimal theory of truth, an issue we deal with later in this
section.
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Is political noncognitivism a reasonable view? The first reason to think so
is that the motivation for moral noncognitivism encompasses political noncog-
nitivism as well, so if moral noncognitivism is a reasonable view, then so is
political noncognitivism. Certainly, persons endorsing moral noncognitivism
could be reasonable – they could be conditional cooperators who recognize the
burdens of judgment. Moral noncognitivists like A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson
could thus conduct themselves in the ways necessary for forming a political con-
sensus, satisfying Reasonableness and entering into the sphere of liberal political
polity. There is no guarantee, of course, that political noncognitivists will be
rule-following cooperators, but there is also nothing in the doctrine that pre-
vents them from being reasonable. Moral or political noncognitivists need not be
beholden to an emotivist metaethic either – Hare’s prescriptivism, Blakburn’s
quasi-realism, and Gibbard’s expressivism would all qualify as well. Hence,
there are a number of routes to formulating a reasonable political noncogni-
tivism, and if Rawls required that all the comprehensive doctrines included in
the overlapping consensus regard political propositions as true, then a reason-
able view held by reasonable persons would be excluded.23
One issue that could count against political noncognitivism is the worry that
it cannot make sense of political reasoning and debate. Moral noncognitivism
has long attempted to answer the Frege-Geach problem, the worry that noncog-
nitivism cannot give an account of valid arguments involving moral premises
and conclusions.24 This defect would then carry over to political noncogni-
tivism. Elijah Millgram claims that, within political noncognitivism, political
views “are not held for reasons” and thus are not up for debate at all.25 If this
charge is correct, then political noncognitivists will not be able to participate in
political debate, handicapping their participation in the overlapping consensus.
There are reasons to think, however, that political noncognitivists need not
accept Milgram’s characterization of their position. A number of responses
have been given to the Frege-Geach problem, including replies by Hare (1952)
and (1970), Blackburn (1984), and Gibbard (1990).26 What is at stake is, not
whether these defenses succeed, but whether it is reasonable to think that they
do. If it is reasonable to think that Hare, Blackburn, or Gibbard offer a solution
to moral cognitivism’s issues with normative reasoning, then the same solution
can be applied to political noncognitivism, securing a view on which Classical
Political Noncognitivism can also give an account of political reasoning. Given
that moral noncognitivists could accept the solutions of Hare, Blackburn, or
23Beyond all of the moral noncognitivists who are also committed to political noncogni-
tivism, political noncognitivism is also explicitly discussed by Estlund (1998), Jaffa (1957),
George (1996), Goldsworthy (1996), Kliemt (1986), Milgram (2005), Misak (2002), Moser
(1979), and Oppenheim (1957).
24For more on the Frege-Geach problem, see Schroeder (2008).
25See Milgram (2005), p. 248.
26Others have responded to the concern that moral noncognitivism cannot account for moral
reasoning, an issue raised by Dorr (2002) – see Budolfson (2011), Lenman (2003), and Mabrito
(2013).
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Gibbard without failing to satisfy Reasonableness, this is a strategy that po-
litical noncognitivists could adopt as well. This does not mean that political
noncognitivists might fail to be liberal in other ways – they could refuse to co-
operate or deny the burdens of judgment – but political cognitivists could also
fall into these traps. Thus, there seems to be no reason in principle to exclude
political noncognitivists from the political consensus.27
Moral noncognitivism has of course received a contemporary update in terms
of how moral assertions interact with truth. A number of noncognitivists now
accept that moral assertions are minimally true according to Horwich’s minimal
theory of truth. Because we regard sentences with normative predicates as prop-
erly featuring in the truth schema, noncognitivists can thus accept that moral
statements are minimally true.28 Political noncognitivists might also make the
same move, accepting that political statements are minimally true instead of
neither true nor false. Even though this option is available, there are two rea-
sons that this does not undermine the need to make room for political noncogni-
tivists in the overlapping consensus. First, a resaonable person could doubt that
adopting truth minimalism is the way forward for moral noncognitivism. Indeed,
many believe that accepting truth minimalism fails solve noncognitivism’s most
pressing difficulties.29 Furthermore, even if updated political noncognitivism is
an objectively stronger view than its more classical formulation, this does not
entail that all political noncognitivists will recognize this fact. Citizens need not
adopt the optimal versions of their doctrines in order to be included in the scope
of the reasonable; there is no requirement that reasonable persons be perfectly
rational.
Rawls’s critics assert that the political noncognitivist who affirms political
liberalism is incoherent; such an individual endorses views that entail the con-
cept of truth even while denying the applicability of this concept. Suppose, for
a moment, that these criticisms are correct. Crucially, such an individual might
still be included in the justificatory constituency, since such an individual, de-
spite holding incoherent views, might still be a tolerant, rule-following coopera-
tor with unhampered practical reasoning faculties who endorses the conceptions
and values latent in the public political culture. These practical features, on
Rawls’s view, are sufficient to enable beneficial cooperation, perhaps even mu-
tual respect. Requiring more is unnecessary. Indeed, it would seem preposterous
to exclude a cooperative, law-abiding philosopher from the political consensus
simply because she has a conceptual incoherence in her philosophical theory.
The surprising upshot is that reasonable people, in Rawls’s terminology, may
be conceptually incoherent. More to the point, reasonable persons will often
27Thank you to an anonymous reviewer from this journal for pressing the objection that
noncognitivism may undermine political reasoning.
28Those who endorse truth minimalism for moral noncognitivism include Horwich (1993)
and Stoljar (1993)
29See, for example, Divers and Miller (1994), Dreier (1996 and 2004), Schroeder (2008), p.
716, and Sinnott-Armstrong (2000).
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seem incoherent from the perspectives of those who hold conflicting comprehen-
sive doctrines. Yet, this seeming incoherence does not undermine the potential
for peaceful cooperation under shared terms of agreement, because this alleged
incoherence is orthogonal to reasonableness.
2.2 Why Avoid Truth? The Publicity Condition
Perhaps this should not be surprising. After all, throughout Political Liberalism,
Rawls describes the central problem that he intends to address as concerning the
possibility of attaining a wide consensus in a diverse population: “How is it pos-
sible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live
together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime?”30
Presumably, this wide consensus aims to include diverse doctrines with mutu-
ally incompatible beliefs. Indeed, it must also include that the wide swath of
citizens whose worldviews are not fully or systematically worked out.
The case of Political Noncognitivism combined with the stated aim of Po-
litical Liberalism together clarify why Rawls sought to avoid appealing to the
concept of truth. If citizens endorse diverse comprehensive doctrines, then inso-
far as the task of a political conception of justice is to reconcile these disparate
doctrines and to function as the focus of an overlapping consensus – to this
extent, a political conception of justice must aim to be compatible with various
divisive philosophical or religious commitments.31 One such commitment is the
nature of truth and its relation to normative propositions, including political
propositions. Since, by hypothesis, all citizens are committed to achieving a
mutually acceptable conception of justice, using the reasonable as a standard
by which to test conceptions of justice is less divisive than using truth as a stan-
dard. In other words, various comprehensive doctrines may not countenance the
concept of truth, and avoiding the concept of truth in political constructivism
allows those who hold such doctrines to endorse the focus of the overlapping
consensus without contradicting their own particular comprehensive doctrines.
As Rawls writes:
One thought is that the idea of the reasonable makes an overlapping
consensus of reasonable doctrines possible in ways the concept of truth
may not.32
And again:
Political constructivism doesn’t use this idea of truth, adding that to
assert or deny a doctrine of this kind goes beyond the bounds of a political
30See Rawls (2005), p. xviii. See also pp. 24, 90, 97, and 100-101.
31Of course, “reconciliation” here is understood in practical, not theoretical terms. To rec-
oncile diverse doctrines does not mean to discover and explain how their various commitments
are ultimately consistent. It is, rather, to show how reasonable citizens can endorse a shared
conception of justice despite comprehensive disagreement. Their interpersonal interactions
can be reconciled, without their comprehensive doctrines being so reconciled.
32Ibid, p. 94.
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conception of justice framed so far as possible to be acceptable to all
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.33
Rawls’s strategy of truth-avoidance comes in the form of “political construc-
tivism,” a procedure in which Rawls leverages certain conceptions of the person
and of society that he takes to be implicit in the culture of any liberal democratic
society. Due to their latent presence in the public culture, such conceptions are–
at least implicitly endorsed by all citizens. In this way, any principles of justice
that emerge from these commonly held values could also be endorsed by all
citizens in the liberal democratic society. Such principles would, almost by def-
inition, achieve acceptance among reasonable persons.
By employing his constructivist procedure, Rawls is able to satisfy a desider-
atum that he calls the “publicity condition.”34 A society can satisfy the publicity
condition on three distinct levels of increasing demandingness:
1) Citizens know and accept a single conception of justice. In addition,
they accurately and justifiably believe, as a part of common public knowl-
edge, that society’s institutions satisfy the demands of this conception of
justice.
2) Citizens affirm the same empirical, social facts that are relevant to
political justice.
3) The full justification (i.e. the argument in support of) the political
conception of justice is publicly known or publicly available.35
To appreciate the importance of this condition, recall the aim of political liberal-
ism and the function of political constructivism.36 As mentioned above, Political
Liberalism seeks to offer an account of how “a plurality of reasonable doctrines,
both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may endorse” a single
political conception of justice. To this end, a constructivist procedure draws
solely from society’s stock of shared values and conceptions, namely those that
are implicit in the public political culture. All three levels of publicity concern
the understanding and endorsement of the political conception, its realization,
and the reasons that underlie and justify it. Without satisfying all three levels,
some citizens in such a society cannot fully, cognizantly endorse the governing
political conception of justice. Therefore, satisfying the publicity condition is
necessary for fully realizing the aim of Political Liberalism:
Publicity – All reasonable citizens can access and endorse the political
conception of justice that regulates society, including the reasons put
forward as its justification
33Ibid, p. 114.
34Ibid, p. 66.
35Ibid, pp. 66-67
36Rawls cites several reasons for the importance and desirability of satisfying the publicity
condition. We focus on the reason that lies closest to the core of his project. For a deeper
discussion of the importance of publicity, see Kogelmann, 2017.
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The method of political constructivism is devised as a means of making the
political conception understandable and justifiable to the citizenry as a whole
– i.e. as a means of satisfying the publicity condition.37 It is this desideratum
that drives Rawls to avoid truth, and to instead employ the public conception
of reasonableness as the standard by which to judge a political conception of
justice. The concept of truth, being denied or doubted by many reasonable
citizens, appears to be inconsistent with the ideal of publicity, and therefore with
the aim of political liberalism. Despite the fact that political noncognitivism
is a theoretical claim, it places limitations on how the public commitment to
liberal values can be justified.
2.3 Joint Impossibility
We have struck upon an inconsistency between Conception Indifference, Rea-
sonableness, and Publicity. Reasonable citizens need only be social cooperators
who recognize the burdens of judgment to qualify as reasonable, but these fea-
tures (1) permit truth-rejecting doctrines, such as Political Noncognitivism, and
(2) lead citizens to endorse the methodology of political constructivism, in which
the political conception must be worked up from shared conceptions so as to
achieve Publicity. Given that reasonable people who do not agree with using
truth in political constructivism are possible, how should Rawls proceed? The
first option would be rejecting Conception Indifference and continuing to es-
chew the concept of truth, leaving Rawls’s project open to the criticisms of Raz,
Estlund, and Cohen. Leaving behind No Political Concept, on the other hand,
would mean either adjusting the conception of ‘reasonable doctrine’ to be more
stringent, thereby requiring a less broad consensus, or giving up on the publicity
condition and accepting that some reasonable persons will be unable to endorse
the political conception of justice. In other words, Rawls must either defend
his method of truth-avoidance or he must sacrifice a core ambition of Political
Liberalism: providing a justification, endorsed by all reasonable doctrines in a
pluralistic democratic society, for a political conception of justice.
3 The (low) Cost of No Political Concept
Should Rawls drop No Political Concept, or should he remain steadfast in ex-
cluding truth from his constructivist argument for the political conception of
justice? Let’s evaluate the relative costs of these two options in light of our
previous discussion.
37For a concise summary and criticism of Rawls’s method of constructivism, see Klosko
(1997). For an account of the evolution of Rawlsian constructivism over Rawls’s life, see
O’Neill (2002).
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3.1 Dropping No Political Concept
We have identified two ways to pay the price of incorporating truth into the
justification of a political conception of justice. The first is by tightening the
conception of reasonableness so that only persons or doctrines that affirm some
concept of truth, or at least do not reject it, receive full justification from their
own point of view. The second is by dropping or weakening the publicity con-
dition, so that not every reasonable citizen can view the governing political
conception of justice as acceptable and fully justified.
First, consider Rawls’s conception of reasonableness. The appropriateness
of this construal of reasonableness is apparent when one recalls that Rawls’s
project is to achieve a political conception of justice and a justification thereof
that a deeply diverse citizenry can endorse. The conception of reasonableness
that Rawls posits is a plausible answer to the following question: What are the
most basic requirements that citizens must meet in order for them to agree on
and abide by a single conception of justice? As the stringency of reasonableness
increases, the diversity of those who must endorse the governing conception of
justice decreases. If we consider reasonable only those who hold appropriately
coherent or true beliefs – according to some understanding of what makes a
set of beliefs coherent – with respect to normative political statements, then
the reasonable constituency to which our justification appeals is smaller, less
diverse, and less realistic.38
Recall our concrete case: Political Noncognitivist. By hypothesis, Political
Noncognitivist is reasonable in Rawls’s sense, yet the political noncognitivist
is mistaken or even incoherent (according to some comprehensive perspectives)
when she endorses a conception of justice. The cost of satisfying Raz, Cohen,
and Estlund by tightening the conception of reasonableness is the exclusion of
such persons from the justificatory constituency. Given the aspirations of Po-
litical Liberalism, this cost may be prohibitive. Before making this conclusion,
however, let us examine Rawls’s other options.
The second way in which Rawls could purchase the concept of truth is by
weakening the publicity condition. However, this approach also has a high price.
As we have seen, the three levels of publicity all describe ways in which citizens,
from their own standpoints, can understand and endorse the institutions and
political conception of justice that prevail in their society. Recall that with-
out satisfying each of the three levels of publicity, there will be some subset
of reasonable persons who cannot endorse the prevailing political conception of
justice. Either they cannot accurately affirm that their society and its institu-
tions satisfy a conception of justice they endorse (first level), they do not agree
with the empirical facts or methods of inquiry that support the justification
of the prevailing conception of justice (second level), or they cannot know or
38Salvaging Rawls’s position by such means would therefore exacerbate the problem of
stability. To appreciate the severity of this problem, see Huemer (1996) and Klosko (1997).
13
A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism
do not have access to the argument used to justify the prevailing conception of
justice (third level). In all cases, a set of reasonable persons is unable to endorse
the political conception of justice and Rawls fails to achieve the stated aim of
Political Liberalism.
What about Cohen’s and Estlund’s political and minimal conceptions of
truth? Neither Cohen nor Estlund propose that a minimal conception of truth
be taken as the complete account. Rather, they propose it as a minimalist core,
which all reasonable persons are free to supplement as their respective compre-
hensive doctrines require.39 Nevertheless, both of these face the same dilemma
– they must either narrow the scope of the reasonable or restrict the publicity
condition.
On Cohen’s view, a political conception of truth must hold that believing,
asserting, and judging are all believing, asserting, and judging to be true; we
must invoke truth to even make sense of these activities. This, as we have
seen, is something that Political Noncognitivist explicitly denies concerning the
principles of justice. For this reason, we disagree with Cohen that a political
conception of truth can avoid deviating from the Rawlsian project. Cohen ex-
plicitly considers Political Noncognitivist, asking, “If public reason includes the
concept of truth, does this impose a barrier for noncognitivists, who tradition-
ally thought that truth is not in play in normative discourse?” Cohen answers in
the negative, arguing that there is nothing in the political conception of truth
that is unacceptable to noncognitivists – “Noncognitivists have no reason to
object to [the political conception of truth], given the relatively minimal com-
mitments that come with it.”40 Here Cohen is wrong to think that Classical
Political Noncognitivists have no reason to object. Even if Cohen were correct
that Classical Political Noncognitivists could purchase truth at no cost,41 this
would not alter the fact that many Reasonable people simply haven’t, A.J. Ayer
and C.L. Stevenson included, and that this does not exclude them from the
political consensus. After all, those who endorse Political Noncognitivism may
well be incoherent. Hence, being less than maximally rational does not prevent
one from participating in the overlapping consensus. Cohen is thus mistaken:
Political Noncognitivists can and do deny that believing, asserting, and judg-
ing, especially in the normative domain, require taking those beliefs, assertions,
and judgments to be true. Cohen must either rule that the Political Cognitivist
is unreasonable or that the she need not publicly endorse the full breadth of
political liberalism.
39As such, this conception of truth differs from standard minimalist accounts of truth,
according to which (1) the minimalist truth schema holds, and (2) the minimalist truth schema
is a complete account of the concept of truth. Cohen and Estlund do not claim that condition
(2) must be affirmed in public reason discourse. For a clear presentation of the minimalist
conception of truth, see Horwich (1990).
40See Cohen (2009), p. 17, fn. 30.
41Many doubt this. For the burdens created by noncognitivism, see Divers and Miller
(1994), Dreier (1996 and 2004), Schroeder (2008), p. 716, and Sinnott-Armstrong (2000).
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Estlund also realizes that the reasonableness of the noncognitivist presents a
challenge to Conception Indifference but thinks that including a minimal concep-
tion of truth in political deliberation can accommodate Political Noncognitivism.
He thinks that there is no reason that the noncognitivist cannot accept his no-
tion of minimal truth – after all, accepting the truth schema does not require
positing any substantial truth property or endorsing that normative claims can
have this property.42 Estlund does not take into account, however, that noncog-
nitivists cannot accept his reason for moving to a minimal conception of truth
in the first place. Recall that, on Estlund’s view, political liberalism must claim
the truth of the standard of reasonable acceptability to ground moral obliga-
tions and political coercion. So it is incorrect to say that political liberalism,
in Estlund’s revisionary account, is only committed to the truth schema – it is
also committed to the thought that truth plays an important role in generating
moral obligations.43 This, though, is to overlook the importance of transparency
in political constructivism. Publicity requires that all parties to the overlapping
consensus acknowledge and endorse the justification of the principles of justice,
including the claim that truth grounds moral obligations. The noncognitivist
cannot accept this methodology, for she denies that truth plays any role what-
soever in normative obligation. Despite Estlund’s efforts at selecting the most
minimal form of a theory of truth, a conflict still arises between Conception
Indifference, Reasonableness, and Publicity, effectively excluding the noncogni-
tivist from the political consensus.44
3.2 Dropping Truth
The cost of satisfying Raz, Cohen, and Estlund and of avoiding incoherence thus
appears to be quite high. In placating his critics, Rawls would undermine the
very aim of his project. What is the cost of continuing to eschew truth? Raz,
Cohen, and Estlund’s basic strategy is to find a contradiction in the approach
taken in Political Liberalism by claiming that Rawls smuggles in or depends
upon the concept of truth all the while claiming to avoid it. Rather than ex-
amining each position separately, as we will in the next section, we consider a
general formulation of the objection. Recall that we understand incoherence as
a contradiction in the beliefs of a particular individual; one is in a state of con-
ceptual incoherence when one’s beliefs are ultimately contradictory. The basic
strategy of Raz, Cohen, and Estlund is to show that political liberalism cannot
42See Estlund (1998), p. 270.
43Even in accepting the minimal conception of truth, Quong is able to dodge this objection
since he argues that truth plays no fundamental role in justification. Consequently, however,
Quong (2011) lacks any reason to include a conception of truth at all, even a minimal, mundane
conception. Even if he is correct that making assertions is equivalent to (or includes) a minimal
truth claim (p. 224), Quong’s buck-passing strategy suggests that this should be an issue for
comprehensive doctrines, not political liberalism, to resolve. Political liberalism can assert P
without asserting (or denying) that P is true.
44Raz (1990) entertains the possibility of Political Noncognitivism, but fails to note how
the noncognitivist provides an argument for No Political Concept. This is because Raz’s main
target is a purported inconsistency in Rawls, not reasons for endorsing No Political Concept
or Conception Indifference (p. 15).
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be coherently held and should therefore be rejected or modified.
The defender of Rawls might think that, in order to avoid this difficulty, the
burden is to show that Rawls’s political conception is a fully coherent system
even without invoking the notion of truth. However, such an approach misses
the point. Given the aims of political liberalism, conceiving of its doctrines as
a systematic whole is a mistake. Instead, political liberalism and its argumen-
tative strategy, political constructivism, aim to provide a radically incomplete
doctrine, one that is so minimal and so restrictive in its assumptions and in its
scope that a deeply diverse society can come to endorse it. Its incompleteness
allows the political conception to function as a “module”45 that can find a basis
of justification among various, incompatible comprehensive doctrines. As such,
there exists a vast array of philosophical questions on which political liberalism
need not – indeed, should not – take a stand. One of these is the question of
truth and its connection to interpersonal, political justification.
Of course, even incomplete doctrines can be incoherent. Political liberal-
ism, however, refrains from passing judgment regarding the truth or coherence
within and between comprehensive doctrines, as well as between political liber-
alism and the various comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable citizens.
Political liberalism maintains only that it is possible for a deeply diverse, though
reasonable, citizenry to affirm a shared conception of justice without sharing a
single comprehensive doctrine. Part of the argument for this claim rests pre-
cisely on the fact that political liberalism says so little about the truth and
logical coherence of philosophical perspectives. By being radically incomplete
in this particular way, political liberalism avoids both internal incoherence and
incoherence with respect to particular comprehensive doctrines.
Contrast the sparsity of political liberalism with the nature of comprehen-
sive doctrines, which include “conceptions of what is of value in human life,
and ideals of personal character. . . ideals of friendship and of familial and asso-
ciational relationships,” as well as metaphysical and religious beliefs.46 It is a
comprehensive doctrine, not a political conception, that may aptly clarify the
conceptual connection between truth and political justification.47 Therefore,
it is only a comprehensive doctrine that can be conceptually incoherent with
respect to the relationship between truth and political justification. Political
liberalism is simply too incomplete to be incoherent on this subject. It does
not propose or deny any theory of truth, any theory of the justificatory im-
portance of truth, or, most pertinently, any theory about which concepts are
inextricably linked to the concept of truth. Instead, political liberalism chooses
to keep its hands out of such matters and to leave them within the realm of the
45See Rawls (2005), p. 12.
46See Rawls (2005), p. 175 and p. 374.
47On this point we are in complete agreement with Jonathan Quong (2011), pp. 226 and
230-238).
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non-political.48
Raz, Cohen, and Estlund therefore take aim at the wrong target. In claim-
ing that political liberalism is incoherent in its eschewal of truth, they miss the
fact that truth may enter into the full justification of a political conception, but
not at the level of political constructivism. Rawls’s contention is simply that
it must do so at the level of the comprehensive doctrine. In other words, even
if truth does not play any role in a conception’s pro tanto justification, it may
still play an indispensable role in the justification arrived at by any individual
from the perspective of his or her comprehensive doctrine. The criticism should
therefore target doctrines like Political Noncognitivism, which doesn’t simply
eschew truth, but positively denies its relevance. These are the doctrines that,
according to Rawls’s critics, hold contradictory views about the nature of politi-
cal justification. If rejecting truth renders political justification incoherent, then
it is the comprehensive doctrine that refuses to accept the concept of truth that
is accountable, not the political conception that takes no stance on the issue.
In principle, Rawls, qua philosopher, could even agree with the criticisms of
Raz, Estlund, and Cohen – but qua political philosopher, searching out a public
basis for political consensus, Rawls might well view such criticisms as irrelevant.
Notice the great virtue of Rawls’s solution. While the reasonable noncognitivist
may fiercely battle Cohen, Estlund, and Raz in the seminar room on the issue
of the proper conceptual connection between truth and justification, she will do
so within a political framework which each participant has a reason to endorse.
The political conception and its political justification are not at stake; they
simply do not deploy the concept of truth, whether or not their doctrines are
viewed (from the perspective of a comprehensive doctrine) as properly relying
upon this concept. The task at hand is to establish a conception of justice that
will allow deeply diverse citizens to cooperate on fair terms, not to discover
the true philosophical doctrine.49 This is the core of Rawls’s point in saying
that political constructivism is an exercise of practical reason, not of theoretical
reason.50
In sum, the critiques of Raz, Cohen, and Estlund apply at the level of the
comprehensive doctrine, and at this level, their correctness or incorrectness is
simply not germane to Rawls’s project. Therefore, the defender of Rawls can af-
firm that the cost of maintaining No Political Concept is low. Some comprehen-
sive doctrines may espouse conceptually coherent and factually accurate beliefs,
and they may supplement the bare-bones justification offered by Rawls with a
theory of normative truth.51 But participants in the overlapping consensus can
also hold positions that are incorrect, even on pain of conceptual incoherence,
48Ibid,. pp. 94, 113, 114, 126, and 129.
49This is not to exclude the possibility of identifying Rawls’s conception of justice as the true
account. Many comprehensive doctrines may choose to do so. The claim that this conception
is true, however, is not a part of political liberalism.
50Ibid, p. 93.
51Ibid, pp. 144-145.
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without ceasing to be reasonable. Precisely which comprehensive doctrines are,
and which are not, incoherent in this way is not a question that Rawls attempts
to, nor should attempt to, answer. Doing so would require the affirmation of,
at least parts of, one or another comprehensive doctrine. The aim of political
liberalism is simply to reconcile these disparate doctrines, to find a conception
that a diverse citizenry “religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal” –
coherent and incoherent – “may endorse for the right reasons.”52
4 A Final Response to the Truthers
Thus far, we have defended Rawls against the suggestion that he endorse Con-
ception Indifference rather than No Political Concept. Adopting Conception
Indifference does serious violence to Rawls’s approach in Political Liberalism,
making it clear that pursuing No Political Concept is the preferable strategy.
Rawls’s critics do not speak with one voice though – their reasons for urging
Rawls to opt for Conception Indifference vary. Therefore, in this final section
we examine each critic’s view in greater detail to ensure that our approach is
able to respond to the particular concerns of each author.
4.1 Raz
Recall that Raz asserts that recommending a principle of justice entails re-
garding that principle as true. Thus, by recommending the outcomes of the
overlapping consensus, Rawls involves himself in a commitment to the truth of
the principles selected by this procedure. One way of construing Raz’s thesis is
that the norm governing the practice of normative assertion is that of knowl-
edge: when one asserts p, one is also affirming that one knows p, and of course,
knowledge entails truth.53
A defender of Rawls might wish to challenge Raz’s thesis by denying that
knowledge is the norm of assertion. Given the task of a political conception of
justice, however, the debate is not over what the norm of assertion actually is,
but what notion of assertion all parties in an overlapping consensus could agree
on. The aim of a certain kind of discourse should have a bearing on the norms
that govern it.54 In political discourse, especially of the justificatory type, the
goal is not to describe a mind-independent reality.55 Instead, the task of po-
52Ibid, p. xxxix.
53For endorsements of the knowledge norm of assertion, see Adler (2002), DeRose (1991,
1996, and 2002), Hawthorne (2003), Stanley (2005), Unger (1975), and Williamson (1996 and
2000). That knowledge entails truth has long been the standard view, see Bonjour (2002), p.
32, Tienson (1974), p. 289, and Williamson (2000), p. 42. For an important rejoinder, see
Hazlett (2010).
54Again, we see that fundamental to Rawls’s approach is presupposing a shared political
task. Arising from the constraints imposed by this task is a standard of public reason, which
allows for interpersonal justification in a society of citizens that share a set of normative
conceptions related to this task. This is another implication of Rawls’s invocation of “practical
reason” as a political idea when developing his constructivist method.
55See Rawls (2005), pp. 91-93 and our Footnote 51.
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litical discourse – for us “here and now” – is related to solving the problem of
political liberalism, viz., “to work out a political conception of political justice
for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines,
both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may endorse for the right
reasons.”56
If political discourse has this practical task, then the norms that govern po-
litical discourse must not generate unnecessary faction or controversy. Different
reasonable doctrines have radically different positions regarding the status and
relevance of truth. Thus, a more sensible norm would be one that all parties
can endorse as in conformity with the values and concerns that motivate po-
litical discourse. Reasonableness, understanding a “reasonable assertion” to be
one which all involved parties can accept insofar as they are reasonable, is (by
definition) the norm that fulfills this requirement. Because the reasonableness
norm is premised on appealing to the reasoning faculties of all involved parties,
it fosters consensus rather than discord, thereby fulfilling the task of political
discourse. Therefore, even if we accept Raz’s claims about normative-political
truth, it does not follow that political constructivism should endorse his view of
the norm of assertion. Political constructivism provides an argument that may
be supplemented in coherent or incoherent ways by diverse comprehensive doc-
trines. Whether it is true or false, coherent or incoherent, will depend on how
a comprehensive doctrine decides to fill out its incomplete doctrines. Again,
political liberalism need not stand alone. It is, instead, a “module. . . that in dif-
ferent ways fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive
doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it.”57
4.2 Cohen
The case of the Political Noncognitivist should not mislead us into thinking
that Rawls is endorsing a noncognitivist understanding of political assertions.
This is important to how Rawls would respond to Cohen’s criticism. Cohen
argues that by using concepts that are conceptually connected to truth, Rawls
commits his political constructivism to something beyond No Political Concept.
Again, as Cohen puts it, “Truth is so closely connected with intuitive notions
of thinking, asserting, believing, judging, and reasoning that it is difficult to
know what leaving it behind amounts to.”58 As in the Rawlsian response to
Raz sketched above, the issue is not that Cohen is wrong about the nature of
belief or of assertion. Rather, it is that many reasonable people disagree, and
therefore an understanding of belief or assertion that involves truth instead of
mere reasonableness is unduly exclusive. One class of such people is that of po-
litical noncognitivists, who hold that normative (political) statements are not
truth-apt. If a noncognitivist were persuaded by Rawls’s constructivist argu-
ment to endorse the political conception of justice and to abide by its demands,
56Ibid, p. xxxix.
57Ibid, p. 145.
58See Cohen (2009), p. 15.
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then whether they think the principles of justice are “true” is beside the point.
This is why Rawls aims to construct the conception out of materials that are
drawn from a public culture, rather than from some particular view of what is
morally worthy or true.
Instead of forwarding reasons for his principles of justice on the basis of their
truth, Rawls proposes a procedure of construction by which each citizen can see
the principles as issuing from their own practical reason and normative concep-
tions. Doing so does not require that Rawls commit himself to any theory of
the truth-aptness of normative claims. In his critique, Cohen exhibits a serious
confusion on this point by arguing that Rawls is committed to a cognitivist view
of normative political statements. First Cohen argues that:
The claims made by a political conception... must be truth-apt ... They
must be, if there is to be a common ground of argument under conditions
of doctrinal disagreement. To deny the truth-aptness of the claims made
on the terrain of public reason would offend against the essential idea of
public reason. That is because the very propositions advanced in public
political argument, even if not taken as or presented in that context
as true, might be judged to be true by the religious or moral doctrine
affirmed by a citizen.59
Cohen is correct to say that Rawls is not free to deny the truth-aptness of nor-
mative claims. Doing so would alienate moral or religious doctrines that judge
such claims to be true or false.60 But from this, Cohen goes on to infer that
“Rawls’s proposal is to endorse a cognitivist understanding of political concep-
tions of justice and political argument on which notions of judgment, reasoning,
and argument are fully in play, while denying the availability of the concept
of truth within such conceptions.”61 This inference, however, is mistaken. It
would be just as illicit for Rawls to endorse and argue from a cognitivist view
as a noncognitivist view. In either case, there are reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, affirmed by reasonable citizens, that reject the metaethical view in
question. Accordingly, the proper path for political constructivism is to avoid
taking a stand on the metaethical dispute between cognitivism and noncogni-
tivism.62 Taking such a stand would undermine the project of political liberal-
ism and thwart the task of political constructivism by rendering the procedure
unpersuasive, unacceptable, or even incomprehensible, to a large group of rea-
sonable citizens. In fact, Rawls explicitly rejects the need to analyze or critique
the theories of truth espoused by the comprehensive doctrines that constitute
the overlapping consensus or to endorse some one theory of truth:
59Ibid, p. 18.
60Cf. Footnote 51.
61Ibid, p. 19.
62Illustrating this idea is the point of introducing Political Noncognitivism. As Rawls (1999)
says, “It is important to notice here that no assumptions have been made about a theory of
truth. A constructivist view does not require an idealist or a verificationist, as opposed to a
realist, account of truth.” (p. 351).
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Political constructivism does not criticize, then, religious, philosophical,
or metaphysical accounts of the truth of moral judgments and of their
validity. Reasonableness is its standard of correctness, and given its
political aims, it need not go beyond that.63
4.3 Estlund
Finally, the constructivist argument that we sketched above also brings into
focus the Rawlsian response to Estlund’s critique. According to Estlund, accep-
tance by a particular group (or set of groups) is insufficient for a doctrine to gain
normative import. Estlund points out that Rawls’s standard of permissibility –
viz. acceptability by reasonable persons – requires some justification aside from
acceptability to reasonable persons. Although such “reflexivity” may well be
a necessary condition for a principle of acceptability to be vindicated, the fact
that reasonable persons all accept the standard of reasonable acceptability is
clearly insufficient due to its circularity. After all, there are many possible “in-
sular” groups, like the Branch Davidians, who could hold that self-acceptability
is the correct standard. In order to justify privileging one standard over others,
one must hold that it is true, not merely reasonable.
The problem, as Estlund sees it, is the lack of explanation as to why political
liberalism should favor acceptability to reasonable persons over acceptability to
Branch Davidians. The need for such an explanation leads Estlund to conclude
that political liberalism must assert the truth of reasonable acceptability as a
standard. Estlund thus seems to believe that truth is the only authorizing fea-
ture, i.e. the only feature that could allow us to pick out one insular group from
among the plurality and to assert its special justificatory status.
Against Estlund’s suggestion, this paper has suggested that we do have good
reason to favor reasonable-acceptability over Branch-Davidian-acceptability, but
this reason is not the truth of such a standard. What makes reasonable ac-
ceptability unique is its connection to the political values implicit in liberal,
democratic societies. Political liberalism establishes an objective criterion of
correctness by drawing on two, mutually supportive aspects: (1) a set of shared
political values or normative political conceptions64 and (2) practical, rather
63See Rawls (2005), p. 127, emphasis added.
64Ibid, p. 117. In this paper, we interpret Rawls as claiming that all reasonable persons
in a liberal democratic society hold a normative conception of the person (free and equal
citizen) and of society (a fair system of cooperation) out of which one can construct a public
political conception of justice. Assuming such shared values might be overly demanding, since
a mere commitment to cooperation could lead individuals to endorse, for political/justificatory
purposes, the public values of freedom, equality, and fairness (Gaus 2011, p.174-6). On the
other hand, Quong (2010) has argued that this requirement is too minimal. Reasonable
persons must be liberal, that is, they must endorse peremptory (though perhaps defeasible)
basic rights (2010, pp. 14-15). On Quong’s account, political liberalism is an internal project,
aiming to demonstrate the acceptability and coherence of liberalism to liberals. We do not
take a stand on this controversy, since our arguments will apply whether or not one accepts
Quong’s internal account of political liberalism. For expository convenience, we assume that
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than theoretical, reason.65 Combining (1) and (2) yields the following: given
that we want a fair, cooperative society, populated by free and equal citizens,
which is governed by a conception of justice that all citizens, as such, can en-
dorse, we should disregard all and only considerations that are unacceptable to
reasonable persons. Any standard stricter than reasonableness would rule out
doctrines compatible with mutually beneficial cooperation; any weaker standard
would include individuals who would undermine such cooperation in virtue of
their unreasonableness. In other words, given our shared aims, practical rea-
son provides an objective criteria of correctness more suitable than truth. This
standard is reasonableness, i.e. acceptability to reasonable persons. Acceptabil-
ity to reasonable persons is therefore unique in that it best achieves the aims of
the political project: realizing freedom, equality, and fairness through consensus
and stability under conditions of deep doctrinal diversity. In this respect, as we
have seen, it outperforms truth. In response to Estlund, therefore, it is the po-
litical task that we are engaged in and the standards that such a task implicates
that favor the criteria of reasonableness over that of Branch-Davidianism.66
4.4 Jonathan Quong as a Contrast Case
An instructive contrast to both Estlund’s position and to our own is that of
Jonathan Quong, briefly discussed in Section 1. Quong accepts Estlund’s min-
imal conception of truth, but he also defends the idea that only comprehen-
sive doctrines, not political conceptions, must clarify the connection between
truth and political justification. Quong refers to this latter idea as “passing
the buck.”67 Political liberalism, Quong concurs, abstains from making claims
about the nature of truth or its role in justification, instead passing this task
on to comprehensive doctrines. Nevertheless, political liberalism “requires” the
minimal conception of truth, according to Quong, because it makes claims and
assertions, such as that “religious persecution is unjust.”68 Instead of rejecting
the minimal conception of truth, therefore, we should reject only “metaphysical
conceptions,” or theories of truth that seek to identify the nature and conditions
parties accept normative conceptions involving freedom, equality, and fairness. We believe
this is the most straightforward reading of Political Liberalism, but the present argument
does not hinge upon this interpretation.
65Rawls develops this aspect of his project in “Lecture III” of Political Liberalism. Note
especially p. 117: “Political constructivism. . . holds that there are different conceptions of
objectivity appropriate for theoretical and practical reason.” See also, pp. 91-93.
66Rawls’s account in Lecture III of how practical reason grounds political justification and
gives rise to a conception of objectivity involves details and nuances which, though important
for fully understanding political constructivism, need not occupy us here. One important
desiderata of a political conception which favors a constructivist procedure that avoids the
concept of truth is “doctrinal autonomy,” (pp. 98-99). This desiderata is one way in which
Rawls might challenge the proposal that Estlund develops elsewhere for an “epistemic political
liberalism” which justifies a procedure (rather than a political conception) in virtue of its
ability to arrive at the “correct answer” to political problems (Estlund 2012.). While an
intriguing proposal, evaluating it further would unfortunately take us too far afield.
67See Quong (2011), pp. 226, 232, and 238-239.
68Ibid, p. 224.
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of truth or of true propositions.
Tellingly, Quong rejects the main reason that Estlund offers in favor of in-
cluding a minimal conception of truth in political liberalism. Estlund, as we
have seen, believes that we must claim that reasonable acceptability is true if
we wish to use it as a ground for our political obligations. By contrast, Quong
argues that “the task of providing a full account of the truth or correctness of
[the principle of reasonable acceptability]. . . is not taken up by political liber-
alism as a theory, but is rather delegated to individual reasonable citizens.”69
The full justification of the principle of reasonable acceptability does not come
from the shared political conception, but from the comprehensive doctrines held
by reasonable citizens who endorse that conception, an upshot of “passing the
buck.”
If Quong rejects Estlund’s reason for including the minimal conception of
truth in political liberalism, why does he nonetheless argue that political lib-
eralism must include such a conception? There are two closely related reasons
why Quong accepts the minimal conception of truth into the framework of po-
litical liberalism. The first is that he views it as entirely benign. The minimal
conception, Quong asserts, “does not appeal to any particular epistemological,
metaethical, or other philosophical theory of truth, and it is consistent with
any of the plausible metaethical, epistemological, or other philosophical posi-
tions one might take with regard to truth.”70 The reason that this minimal
conception of truth is so inoffensive is that, on this conception, to claim “P”
is to claim “P is true” and vice versa. To assert the truth of a proposition is
exactly as controversial as the mere assertion of the proposition. This leads us
to the second reason Quong has for endorsing this conception of truth. Political
liberalism must make certain assertions and deny others. For example, political
liberalism must deny the claim that acceptability to all Branch Davidians is a
necessary requirement for a political conception, “[b]ut when political liberalism
declares [this] claim is mistaken, it makes a truth claim of the mundane sort.”71
Neither of Quong’s two reasons justifies the use of the minimal conception
of truth in political liberalism. First, as we argued above, there exist – or could
exist – perfectly reasonable persons who deny the relevance of truth in political
justification even if this philosophical position is indefensible from a theoretical
perspective. Quong may reply that he does not intend for the minimal concep-
tion to play a role in political justification. If this is the case, then there appears
to be no reason to employ this conception when laying out the argument for a
political conception. Instead of asserting “P is true, therefore Q,” we can sim-
ply assert the more ecumenical “P, therefore Q.” Thus, in response to Quong’s
second reason for including the minimal conception, we simply point out that
truth need not be invoked in making assertions. Rawls goes to great lengths in
69Ibid, p. 237.
70Ibid, p. 224.
71Ibid, p. 237.
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Lecture III of Political Liberalism to develop a notion of objective correctness
that does not seek recourse to any conception of truth, minimal or otherwise.
The upshot of Rawls’s work in this lecture is that to determine whether or not
a particular assertion is correct (in the context of political justification), we can
appeal to reasonableness rather than to truth. In this way, we avoid any and
all controversy related to the concept of truth. Quong is therefore mistaken
in thinking rejecting the Branch Davidian principle requires us to assert that
this principle is false. Instead, we can point to its unreasonableness as grounds
for its rejection. How, or if, reasonableness connects to truth is a matter for
comprehensive doctrines to determine.72
Conclusion
Raz, Cohen, and Estlund may be right that assertion, belief, and moral grounds
are conceptually connected to truth, but we have seen that this does not un-
dermine Rawls’s avoidance of truth within political liberalism. On the level of
a political conception, the question of truth and its connection to justification
is best left untreated. On the level of comprehensive doctrines, we might (from
the perspective of our own comprehensive doctrines) identify other doctrines
as incoherent. But this need not entail that those holding such doctrines are
unreasonable. The success or failure of a comprehensive doctrine to formulate
a coherent full justification for the political conception of justice lies beyond
the purview of political liberalism. The alleged incoherence of a theory of truth
does not, therefore, prevent its adherents from participating in the overlapping
consensus. In the end, Rawls’s approach that avoids the concept of truth may
stand as an inclusive method for political justification.
Our primary objective in this paper was to defend Rawls against Raz, Co-
hen, and Estlund. Even if we have been successful in this aim, our approach
nevertheless raises questions about political liberalism more generally. One is-
sue that is worth further exploration moving forward is the question of just how
incoherent members of the overlapping consensus can be. Can citizens hold
obviously contradictory views, or are there limits to how irrational reasonable
people might be? Likewise, if someone ascribes to blatantly inconsistent beliefs,
can we even make sense of them endorsing the principles of justice? Presumably,
if a citizen endorses a principle of justice, they do not believe it is both just and
unjust, so rampant incoherence will make it difficult to make sense of even the
original endorsement of the principles of justice.
One direction that might be worth exploring in response to these concerns is
the moderate idealization advocated by Gerald Gaus. On Gaus’s account, the
views endorsed by citizens are those that they would hold after a “respectable
72Quong is, of course, correct that we may, if we want, simply define truth so that “Not-P”
is equivalent to “P is not true.” However, it does not follow that we must do so. This minimal
conception is not “required,” as Quong claims it is, because, as Rawls argues, we can employ
reasonableness as a standard for assessing claims and arguments.
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amount” of reasoning, ruling out obvious contradictions, e.g., that a principle
is both just and unjust.73 Adopting such a requirement would rule out subjects
whose views are a mess of contradictions, clarifying how it is possible for an
incoherent citizen to nevertheless endorse the principles of justice. Importantly,
moderate idealization would also allow the sorts of incoherence we have focused
on in this paper, in particular that of the political noncognitivist. Even if polit-
ical noncognitivism is incoherent, seeing so takes far more reasoning than mod-
erate idealization requires of members of the overlapping consensus, preserving
the thought that political liberalism does not rule out incoherent comprehensive
doctrines. One possible development to Rawls’s position, then, in response to
worries about allowing unchecked irrationality within political liberalism, would
be to adopt a notion of moderate idealization. This would help explain both
how it is possible for citizens within the overlapping consensus to endorse the
principles of justice as well as set principled limits on the amount of incoherence
that can be tolerated within political liberalism.
73See Gaus (2011, p. 253). Varieties of moderate idealization are also endorsed by Vallier
(2014), pp. 145-180, and (Forthcoming) and Van Schoelandt (2015).
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